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Our ability to think creatively is one of the factors that generates excitement in our lives as
it introduces novelty and opens up new possibilities to our awareness which in turn lead to
developments in a variety of fields from science and technology to art and culture. While
research on the influence of biologically-based variables on creativity has a long history, the
advent of modern techniques for investigating brain structure and function in the past two
decades have resulted in an exponential increase in the number of neuroscientific studies
that have explored creativity. The field of creative neurocognition is a rapidly growing
area of research that can appear chaotic and inaccessible because of the heterogeneity
associated with the creativity construct and the many approaches through which it can
be examined. There are also significant methodological and conceptual problems that are
specific to the neuroscientific study of creativity that pose considerable limitations on our
capacity to make true advances in understanding the brain basis of creativity. This article
explores three key issues that need to be addressed so that barriers in the way of relevant
progress being made within the field can be avoided.
(a) Are creativity neuroimaging paradigms optimal enough?
(b) What makes creative cognition different from normative cognition?
(c) Do we need to distinguish between types of creativity?
Keywords: creative cognition, normative cognition, creative neurocognition, cognitive neuroscience, definitions,
approaches, conceptual limitations, technical limitations
The immense capacity of human beings to be creative can be
gleaned from virtually all realms of our lives whenever we gener-
ate original ideas, develop novel solutions to problems, or express
ourselves in a unique and individual manner. Despite the vital
importance of this complex ability for the progress of our species
across all fronts of human development, we still lack fundamen-
tal knowledge about how creative thinking occurs. What makes
some people appear more creative than others? How much con-
trol do we exert over the expression of our creative abilities? Why
are we sometimes unable to think with originality despite strenu-
ous efforts, yet at other times we experience the flow of creativity
almost effortlessly? Can we train our mental faculties to become
more creative? How much of our creative potential is biologically
predetermined? These are some of the many questions that beg
further exploration.
Among the many approaches that have been applied to inves-
tigate creativity, the neurobiological approach has a surprisingly
long history. The characterization of the brain’s response when
generating novel responses was achieved through the use of
direct and indirect global measures, such as electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG) and lateralization paradigms (for reviews, see Miran
and Miran, 1984; Martindale, 1999). In fact, the insights from
these studies beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, about the role
of alpha wave brain activity during creative thinking, or left
brain versus right brain contributions during the creative act,
continue to influence EEG and cerebral asymmetry research
in creativity to this day (Lindell, 2011; Fink and Benedek,
2012).
The mass availability of neuroimaging techniques began in
the 1990s and resulted in an exponential surge of neuroimaging-
based research to the extent that questions from virtually all
domains in psychology have been (or are being) explored. The
field of creativity is no exception to this trend (for a review, see
Dietrich and Kanso, 2010).
While adapting most experimental paradigms in psychology
for exploration using functional neuroimaging techniques is not
unduly problematic, the same cannot be said for paradigms from
the field of creativity. There are unique problems, both theoreti-
cal and methodological, that surface when trying to adapt most
creativity tasks for use in neuroimaging environments. These
problems, although seldom openly discussed or acknowledged,
have significant implications for developing our understanding
of how creative thinking develops (Dietrich, 2007a; Sawyer, 2011;
Abraham, 2012). This treatise will explore some of the most per-
tinent issues that can deter progress from being made in the field.
These can be formulated in the form of three questions.
(a) Are creativity neuroimaging paradigms optimal enough?
(b) What makes creative cognition different from normative
cognition?
(c) Do we need to distinguish between types of creativity?
ARE CREATIVITY NEUROIMAGING PARADIGMS OPTIMAL
ENOUGH?
The best way to consider this question would be contrast the gen-
eral paradigm-based differences, both technical and conceptual,
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between commonly used creative tasks and non-creative tasks of
higher-order cognition from other domains that involve engaging
one’s imagination, such as future thinking or hypothetical reason-
ing, or other aspects of higher-order cognition, such as declarative
memory retrieval (e.g., Zysset et al., 2002; Abraham et al., 2008;
Abraham and von Cramon, 2009).
There are several differences in methodological protocols
(Table 1). Let us take the case of the number of trials per con-
dition and trial duration. Functional run(s) in a typical fMRI
experiment are usually limited to about 40min as a maximum.
Each trial in any fMRI paradigm does not only include the
stimulus events(s) and/or responses, but also pauses of varying
duration (typically a few seconds long). So the trial lengths in
fMRI experiments are always longer than those of behavioral
experiments. There is of course a wide range of possibilities when
it comes to trial duration, which depends on research question
and the type of experimental design being adopted (e.g., event-
related versus block). However, in general, within experimental
designs used to assess creativity, the duration of a single trial
is much longer compared to other cognitive paradigms. This is
because the stimulus events themselves are presented over longer
periods (around 8–20 s), and these are often followed by a lengthy
response phase. So this prolongation of trial duration usually nec-
essarily means that there are far fewer trials in total per condition
in fMRI paradigms that assess creativity compared to those that
assess other complex aspects of cognition. This can have a con-
siderable impact on the power and efficiency of the experimental
design and, consequently, the confidence with which we can
interpret the resulting findings.
Table 1 | A generalized comparison of common methodological and
conceptual differences between creative and non-creative tasks.
Non-creative Creative imagination
imagination task task
Trials: number per
condition
>20 <20
Trial duration <10 s >10 s
Trial classification Hit, miss, false alarm,
correct rejection
Predetermined (not
based on response
type)
Response type Close-ended Open-ended
Response options Binary Non-binary
Response modality Button press Vocal responses or
Button press
Response log Tracked in real-time (as
it happens)
Recorded after the fact
Control task: match to
experimental task
High Low
Cognitive event:
determining start point
Often Rare
Cognitive event:
prompt on cue
Yes No
Certainty regarding
process activation
High Low
Certainty regarding
tested process
High response
accuracy = better
cognitive performance
Trying to be creative =
Being creative
The efficiency-power tradeoff (Liu et al., 2001) is an important
factor to consider when devising fMRI experimental paradigms.
Here, power refers to the ability to detect any activation in the
brain and efficiency refers to the accuracy at determining the
shape of the hemodynamic response function to stimuli 1. The
power of an fMRI experimental design is exponentially related
to number of trials per condition (until around 100–150 trials),
whereas efficiency is acceptable at around 25 trials per condition
(Huettel and McCarthy, 2001; Desmond and Glover, 2002). The
problem is that the use of less than 20 trials per condition is not
uncommon within fMRI experimental designs of creativity.
A further problem is the appropriateness of the control task to
the creative task in question. Most neuroimaging studies on cre-
ativity compare brain activation elicited during creative thinking
(e.g., generate a story using three semantically unrelated words)
with that of a less cognitively demanding control tasks (e.g., gen-
erate a story using three semantically related words) or unspecific
states such as rest. The latter option is particularly problematic
to employ as a baseline given its utter lack of specificity (Stark
and Squire, 2001). Indeed, one the earliest neuroimaging studies
on episodic memory even referred to the resting brain as “. . . a
resource not only for the creative process, but also for medi-
tational states, religious experiences, and dreams” and that its
activities reflect “substrates of the creative process” (Andreasen
et al., 1995, p. 1577, 1583). Less cognitively demanding control
tasks are also suboptimal to use as comparisons to creative tasks
as it is not possible under such circumstances to tease apart the
components of ensuing brain activations resulting from increased
cognitive control with that of creative idea generation. Recent
studies have attempted to optimally control for differing difficulty
levels between the creative and non-creative control tasks through
the use of different strategies (Abraham et al., 2012b; Aziz-Zadeh
et al., 2012), but it is often at the expense of having a control task
(s) that is qualitatively very different from the creative task.
Even at the level of response, creativity researchers face unique
problems in implementation. Typically most creativity tasks are
non-binary (cannot be reduced to yes/no decisions), open-ended
(involve more than one response), subjective (there are no cor-
rect or incorrect responses as long as they are valid), and involve
movement (spoken, written or drawn). Moreover, responses are
rarely logged in “real-time,” i.e., as and when each creative
response is generated. Typically, the participants are exposed to
a stimulus cue, which indicates the task that they have to under-
take over an extended period of time without moving (e.g., think
of as many uses as you can for a “brick”). Following that, they
are usually given a response cue after which they can indicate
their responses within the scanner during temporally isolated
response phases via either vocal (single word or more elaborate
articulations) or button press responses. This manner of response
isolation is for the purpose of minimizing movement-related
problems (unspecific brain activations and potential motion arti-
facts) from affecting the pattern of findings. However, because
1Online sources for information regarding fMRI design related issues
include: (1) http://mindhive.mit.edu/book/export/html/66 (2) http://
imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/DesignEfficiency (3) http://afni.nimh.
nih.gov/pub/dist/HOWTO//howto/ht03_stim/html/stim_background.shtml.
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such response isolation strategies are not foolproof, another alter-
native is to not have any actual responses during the imaging
session but instead to instruct subjects in advance that they will be
required to report their generated uses after the experiment. The
problem of this approach is that one cannot be certain that the
subjects are actually following task instructions during the imag-
ing session, nor can one be sure that the responses are untainted
by forgetting or post-experiment elaboration (for a compromise
between both approaches and a lengthy discussion on this topic
see, Abraham et al., 2012b).
Another problem with not having responses logged and coded
in real time is that it is challenging to determine whether the
trial can really be classified as creative or not. In a memory recall
task, for instance, one can assess a subject’s performance based
on objective, close-ended, binary responses that can be instantly
classified (following signal-detection theory, for instance) in the
form of hits, misses, correct rejections and false alarms. The
same cannot be done for creativity as the responses are assessed
after the fact in terms of levels of creativity. What is more, each
trial can be associated with multiple responses. In the absence of
the on-line logging of responses, there is no way of knowing at
which points during the extended trial the uses were generated,
much less determine when the most creative of all the uses was
produced.
The unfortunate truth is that one is particularly dependent on
behavioral responses in creativity tasks because the stimulus event
or task cue does not automatically evoke the necessary cognitive
processes under study. Creativity cannot simply be prompted in
a manner that is reliable or valid. This is one of the factors that
set creative thinking apart most other aspects of cognition and
renders it incredibly challenging to investigate. If asked whether
you cut your hair last week or know the capital of Iceland, the
question in itself would suffice as a prompt to evoke a response
(yes/no). This is not so when you have to generate new uses for
objects or create an original story or manipulate images to form
a meaningful yet novel gestalt. So in the absence of a behavioral
marker, we do not know the starting point of the cognitive event
in question (generation of the creative idea) and analyses of the
brain’s response in relation to the actual point of creative insight
cannot be conducted without this information.
Moreover, within an extended period ranging from a couple of
seconds to almost half a minute when subjects have to generate
novel uses for an object, the brain activation during that period
reflects a mixture of brain regions that are engaged while devel-
oping strategies to solve the problem in conjunction with those
involved in the actual generation of the solution. To make matters
worse, the generated solution may be valid or invalid as well as
creative or uncreative. And none of these factors can be effectively
teased apart in such designs (e.g., strategy versus solution; creative
versus uncreative solutions). Although several researchers specif-
ically instruct their subjects to “be creative”, this is not a simple
instruction to follow and is easier said than done. Merely instruct-
ing people to be creative does not guarantee their ability or success
to do so. Notwithstanding the problem of definition of what it
means to be creative (which will be explored later), our brains are
not immune to the “path of least-resistance”, which is the over-
whelming tendency, owing to our cost-effective brains, to follow
the cognitively least demanding route in in generative situations
(Ward, 1994).
These technical limitations of creativity paradigms are related
to a much larger conceptual problem, namely that trying to be
creative is not the same as being creative—a fact that all of us are
likely to be keenly aware of from personal experience. While it is
certainly useful to assess the pattern of brain response when peo-
ple are trying to be creative in order to understand what happens
in the brain when people are being creative, it is important that
we, at the very least, remain cognizant of this crucial distinction
and let it guide our interpretations of data accordingly.
So what does this admittedly daunting picture tell us about the
state of affairs in the neuroimaging of creativity?
It illustrates that challenging times lie ahead and that the field
is in need of a major paradigm-shift. While the extension of other
cognitive paradigms to neuroscience may be unproblematic, the
simple truth is that this cannot be done with the same degree of
ease in the case of creativity.
This does not mean that creative thinking cannot be studied
using neuroscientific techniques. But any technique, no mat-
ter how promising it may appear, is useless if the experimental
designs are suboptimal. We need to devise experimental designs
that are optimized for use in neuroscientific setups to investi-
gate different facets of creative thinking. Or indeed, in the words
of Arne Dietrich: “It is high time that researchers became more
creative about creativity” (Dietrich, 2007b).
Indeed, several attempts to turn the tide are already underway.
Some researchers have, for instance, conducted functional neu-
roimaging investigations of creativity as it occurs in the real world
during musical improvisation and story generation (Limb and
Braun, 2008; Shah et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012). Such open-ended
approaches are necessarily less controlled in terms of methodol-
ogy compared to close-ended approaches, but the upside is that
they assess creative thinking in a more ecologically valid manner.
Indeed, such tradeoffs between methodological standards and the
assessment of real world versus lab creativity may be unavoidable.
Another approach has been to circumscribe creativity in terms
of its component processes, such as insight (Bowden and Jung-
Beeman, 2007), conceptual expansion (Abraham et al., 2012b;
Kröger et al., 2012; Rutter et al., 2012a,b), creative imagery (Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2012; Ellamil et al., 2012), and so on. In order to
understand this approach better, we need to explore the next core
question of the distinctiveness of cognitive operations involved in
creativity.
WHAT MAKES CREATIVE COGNITION DIFFERENT FROM
NORMATIVE COGNITION?
Several neuroscientific approaches have been adopted to relate
creativity to brain function. Neuroimaging, EEG and ERP inves-
tigations of creativity (for a review, see Dietrich and Kanso, 2010)
seek to characterize (a) what aspect of brain function differen-
tiates highly creative people from less creative people, and/or
(b) what pattern of activity the brain exhibits when we think cre-
atively compared to when we do not. In investigations using the
former individual differences or between-subjects approach, indi-
viduals are classified as less or more creative according to their
performance on a certain metric(s). Comparing brain function
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across high and low performing groups are held to reveal which
brain-related factors have a significant impact on creative abil-
ity (e.g., Jung et al., 2010; Takeuchi et al., 2010b). The lat-
ter intra-individual or within-subjects approach holds that all
human beings have the capacity to be creative and that assess-
ing brain function during creative versus non-creative thought
can reveal insights about which brain-related factors have a sig-
nificant impact on creative idea generation (e.g., Green et al.,
2012; Kröger et al., 2012; Rutter et al., 2012b). Other approaches
include neuropsychological investigations of creativity in neu-
rological patients (e.g., Miller et al., 1996; Seeley et al., 2008;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2011; Abraham et al., 2012a) and psychi-
atric populations (e.g., Andreasen and Powers, 1975; Abraham
et al., 2007) which explore the brain-related factors that are
related to impaired or enhanced creativity in clinical groups
relative to matched healthy controls.
What is interesting to note is that despite these efforts to
understand high versus low creativity, or creative versus non-
creative aspects of cognition, very little is known about how
exactly creative thinking is supposed to be different from non-
creative thinking. At the heart of most investigations relating
creativity to brain function is the implicit idea that creative
aspects of cognition are different from non-creative aspects of
cognition. What is still a mystery though is the nature of this
difference. Creative thinking certainly feels special. But does that
necessarily mean that it is special? Such presuppositions are rarely
discussed within the literature.
We have much reason to presume that creativity is distinct
from other aspects of cognition. Compare the creative act of writ-
ing a poem to the act of reciting the same poem from memory.
It seems illogical to imagine that the cognitive processes behind
the act of creating a poem are in any way congruous to those
involved in memorizing it. However, if some form of qualitative
distinctiveness between creative and normative aspects of cogni-
tion is assumed to exist, how are these instantiated in the brain?
Is the information processing toolbox for creative cognition com-
pletely distinct from that of normative cognition (Figure 1A)? Do
they partially overlap (Figure 1B)? Or are they one and the same
(Figure 1C)? Again, as such issues are not debated within the field,
it is impossible to adequately weigh the pros and cons of each
option at this juncture.
Chief among the researchers who took a stand on such issues
(e.g., Boden, 2004; Dietrich, 2004; Abraham and Windmann,
2007), were the proponents of the Geneplore model or the cre-
ative cognition approach who espoused the third view (Ward
et al., 1995; Finke et al., 1996). According to this approach, the
network of mental operations or the information processing tool-
box is the same regardless of whether one is engaged in a creative
or non-creative cognitive task. The essential difference between
creative and non-creative thought processes lies in contextual
(situational or task) factors that pose demands on performance.
Creativity tasks necessitate generativity on the part of the subjects,
as their problem contexts call for more open-ended, unstructured
or non-linear information processing strategies to be adopted
compared to cognitive tasks that do not necessitate creativity. For
example, contrast the contextual demands involved when asking
participants to report common uses for an object compared to
FIGURE 1 | Three conceptualizations of the relationship between
creative and normative cognition: (A) mutually exclusive, (B) partially
overlapping, (C) undifferentiated.
generating novel uses. In the former case, one needs to recall dif-
ferent contexts in which that object was used in the past, whereas
in the latter case, recalling stored information is not enough as
one has to imagine new uses. The emphasis of the creative cogni-
tion approach is that one can understand the complex dynamics
of creative thinking by assessing cognitive processes in contexts
that are fundamentally generative in nature.
This idea fits with recent proposals concerning the inter-
face between the fields of psychology and neuroscience which
have shown that psychological states, such as thoughts and feel-
ings, and brain states may not be instantiated in an equivalent
manner to one another (Barrett, 2009; Bressler and Menon,
2010; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). This is also referred to as the
“mind-brain correspondence problem” and reflects the need to
understand that psychological states emerge from the interaction
between more basic or primitive mental components (Barrett,
2009). Such ideas resonate with that of the creative cognition
approach where several component creative cognitive operations
have been operationalized (Abraham and Windmann, 2007).
Conceptual expansion and insight are among the more widely
investigated creative cognition components in relation to brain
function (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2012b; Kröger et al., 2012;
Rutter et al., 2012a,b), whereas research which has implications
for other components like creative imagery and the constraining
influence of examples is still in the nascent phase (Abraham et al.,
2012a; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2012; Ellamil et al., 2012; Fink et al.,
2012).
Assumptions underlying the individual differences or
between-subjects approach where the aim is to uncover the
information processing or brain biases that differentiate highly
creative individuals from average or low creative individuals,
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are also rarely questioned. Such ideas have a long history with
leading theorists in the field attributing high creative ability to flat
associative hierarchies in semantic knowledge (Mednick, 1962),
defocused attentional processing (Mendelsohn, 1974), and cog-
nitive disinhibition (Martindale, 1999). High creativity has been
associated with a host of brain-related factors such as reduced
white matter integrity in inferior frontal brain regions (Jung
et al., 2010), increased grey matter in dorsolateral prefrontal and
striatal areas (Takeuchi et al., 2010b), integrated white matter
tracts of the corpus callosum and association cortices (Takeuchi
et al., 2010a), greater right hemisphere contributions (e.g.,
Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003), increased frontal lobe activity
(e.g., Carlsson et al., 2000) and heightened alpha synchronization
(e.g., Fink et al., 2009).
The question that arises in such contexts is if the global brain-
related differences between low and high creatives are specific to
creativity (in that they have no impact on other aspects of cog-
nition) or not. Regardless of whether this question is answered
in the affirmative or the negative, the theoretical implications
that derive from either stance needs to be discussed in a wider
context. If such global differences have an impact on processes
beyond creativity, in what other aspects of cognition would the
high creatives appear to be more or less adept than the low cre-
atives? In contrast, if such global differences specific to creativity,
how is this domain-specific information processing toolbox for
creativity characterized in the brain?
There is also the chicken-and-egg problem of what came first.
Are the high creatives more creative because they have greater
masses of grey matter in specific brain areas or does grey matter
increase lead to higher creativity? Moreover, how generalizable are
such findings within and across domains? Would a positive cor-
relation between cortical connectivity and originality on a verbal
creativity measure X also be expected when using another ver-
bal creativity measure Y? How would these insights extend to
performance on nonverbal measures of creativity?
A further issue of concern in this context is the choice of the
control group to the high creatives. Groups are usually classi-
fied according to their performance on one or more creativity
measures. However, as many creativity tasks are not comprehen-
sive standardized (compared to IQ measures, for instance), it can
be challenging to determine what the performance levels truly
indicate. Does poor performance on the remote associates test,
for instance, indicate below average or average creative ability?
Depending on how this question is answered, the choice of which
control group (low creative or average creatives) would be a bet-
ter comparison group to the high creatives is a critical one that is
likely to impact how one interprets the associated findings. What
is also at stake is how far one can generalize such findings to the
general population.
Another potentially problematic issue is the implicit idea that
creativity is an inherent trait of sorts. This is because it is clear
upon examining the trajectory of productivity in any individ-
ual who is considered to have reached the pinnacle of creative
achievement (e.g., Picasso or Einstein), that there is consider-
able variability in the degree and quality of output throughout
their lifetime. This suggests that creative output cannot be solely
explained in terms of inherent traits but also that fluctuating or
state-based aspects of creative cognition need to be considered
(Harnad, 2006), even in cases of exceptional creative ability.
Some researchers assess high and low creative groups by com-
paring individuals who are highly proficient in ostensibly creative
pursuits (e.g., art, music, dance) versus those who are not. One
of the overwhelming shortcomings in faced when using this
approach is to ensure homogeneity in the samples (within and
between groups). What is more, the assumption that insights
about creativity can be only genuinely attained by investigat-
ing people who pursue the arts compared to other professions
is highly debatable for two major reasons. First, creativity is
highly valued trait not just in the arts but also across a range
of professions including medicine, engineering, marketing, law,
advertising, research, teaching and even accounting. Second, it is
fallacious to presume that anyone who pursues the fine or per-
forming arts is, by virtue of that fact alone, guaranteed to be
highly creative. Indiscriminate overgeneralizations of this nature
hinder progress in the field as it propagates misrepresentations
that affect our conceptualizations of creativity. This brings us to
the next core question of what creativity entails.
DOWE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TYPES OF
CREATIVITY?
To get a full sense of the current predicament faced by creativity
researchers, it would be helpful to imagine the field of memory
research in the absence of an established structural framework
to distinguish between different types of memory. So the now
well-recognized distinctions between declarative or explicit and
non-declarative or implicit forms of memory would be unknown.
Now imagine the task faced by any memory researcher who has to
make generalizations about memory function by sifting through
this rapidly growing mass of undifferentiated findings in rela-
tion to memory. Keep in mind that the findings associated with
learning though conditioning (such as knowing that direct con-
tact with fire is dangerous) would be muddled together with those
of procedural skills (such as the ability to ice skate), and knowl-
edge about facts (such as the name of your best friend in the
4th grade), as well as visuo-spatial memory (such as the way to
get from your apartment to your office). It would be incredibly
challenging for anybody to infer any viable ideas about mem-
ory, especially in relation to the brain, under these circumstances.
Such an undertaking would allow only a vague understanding
of the brain basis of memory function (e.g., the hippocampus
is involved. Period.) together with the utter inability to develop
a model of its information processing mechanisms. The field of
memory research is greatly aided by having systematic theoreti-
cal frameworks that guide interdisciplinary empirical work. The
same conditions are necessary for the field of creativity research if
truly significant advances are to be made.
What is essential then is that creativity researchers develop a
framework within which the myriad findings can be accurately
classified. Naturally this is easier said than done and one can
only start with baby steps. It is necessary to first understand what
is meant by creativity before we attempt to carve this weighty
concept at the joints. So what is creativity?
Creativity is defined by the presence of two components:
originality (uniqueness or novelty) and effectiveness (relevance
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or appropriateness) (Stein, 1953; Runco and Jaeger, 2012).
Originality is the key factor at the root of this concept as some-
thing that is not unusual or new in any way cannot be considered
creative. Effectiveness is also vital as a response that is original but
not relevant to a particular context may be considered weird or
odd, but not creative.
Despite this surprisingly simple definition, the findings associ-
ated with creativity, particularly the neuroscience of creativity, can
appear cluttered, inaccessible and even contradictory. One reason
for this is that while this definition of creativity is readily appli-
cable in tasks that call for some form of creative problem solving
(such as in the alternate uses task), it is not as simple to apply
this definition in the context of the arts. It is more difficult to
obtain a consensus on both the presence and the degree of origi-
nality associated with a work of art as well as to determine to what
extent the factor of effectiveness plays a role. This is ironic given
that the concept of creativity is most closely bracketed with that
of the arts.
Another major reason for the disorganized picture is that cre-
ativity has been assessed using different approaches by means of a
wide range of tasks and even different behavioral measures within
each task (Arden et al., 2010). Yet the reported findings are rarely
circumscribed in terms of their specific implications in relation
to select aspects of creativity (e.g., fluency in creative idea genera-
tion) and are instead, indiscriminately presented as concerning
creativity as a whole. Other problems include the questionable
equivalency when adapting established creativity tasks, such as
the remote associates test, for use in non-English speaking con-
texts (for a lengthy discussion on this issue, see Abraham et al.,
2012a).
There are a plethora of research topics related to creativity
but very little debate or discussion to bring the different areas
together. These include musical creativity, visual creativity, synes-
thesia and creativity, divergent thinking, insight and convergent
thinking, scientific creativity, artistic creativity, verbal creativity,
creative problem solving, creativity and analogical reasoning, and
creativity and metaphors. Further complications result because
it is unclear how creativity in one domain relates to creativity
in other domains. For instance, it would be useful to know if
(and how) insights on “visual creativity” extend to “artistic cre-
ativity” but not “verbal creativity”. This is, of course, difficult to
do because we lack a unifying framework within which widely
disparate facets of creativity can be brought together.
A first step that can be taken to aid the development of such
a framework would be to assess neuroscientific studies of cre-
ative thinking in terms of determining the implications of their
results for a particular branch of creative thinking. One possi-
bility would be to assign the studies as falling under one of two
basic branches or domains of creativity: problem solving and
expression (Figure 2). Problem solving abilities are customarily
assessed by performance on one or more creativity measures that
assess analytical thinking (Grabner et al., 2007; Jung et al., 2010),
whereas expression abilities are mainly determined by the degree
of proficiency in a particular domain (e.g., art, dance) with high
expressive ability being defined as above average (Fink et al., 2009;
Gibson et al., 2009) or exceptional (Hou et al., 2000; Snyder,
2009). The goal in the case of creative problem solving is to
develop novel solutions to problems whereas the goal in the case
of creative expression is to express oneself in a unique manner.
The underlying commonality between creative problem solving
and creative expression domains would be that both involve prob-
lem finding, problem creation or problem identification (Getzels,
1975; Csikszentmihalyi andGetzels, 1988), which is central to cre-
ative thinking. However, they differ in terms of contextual factors
which can be classified as predominantly problem solving based
or, alternatively, predominantly expression based. The word “pre-
dominantly” is employed here to make apparent that the problem
solving and expression domains are not mutually exclusive.
The problem solving and expression domains can be further
classified into subdomains. For instance, separate expression sub-
domains can be envisioned for artistic, musical, kinesthetic and
verbal skills. Each of these can be further subdivided into mean-
ingful categories and this would be best done in consultation
with researchers with the necessary expertise in research on these
expression and proficiency aspects of creative thinking.
The problem solving domains could be subdivided in a sim-
ilar manner. The classic division of convergent versus divergent
thinking may be applicable here. In creative convergent thinking,
the means-state and end-state of the problem is known but the
path to get from the means-state to the end-state is not linear and
necessitates conceptual restructuring. Successful restructuring is
commonly associated with the phenomenon of insight. In creative
divergent thinking, in contrast, the end-state is unknown and
there is more than one potential solution to the problem. So the
path to the end-state has to be charted and the end-state itself has
to be conceived. There is no reason to assume that the process of
insight is limited to convergent contexts, as it would be expected
to accompany any situation where a novel connection is forged
between previously unrelated or weakly related concepts. It may
be viable to also distinguish between theoretical versus applied
subdomains in the problem solving domain with domains such
as mathematical and physics falling under the theoretical domain,
whereas medicine and engineering fall under the applied domain.
It is possible that cognitive strategies to generate ideas may be
commonly applied across creative problem solving and expres-
sion domains but that the contextual factors differ according to
the domain in question. For instance, recent meta-analyses were
conducted to dissociate metaphor and analogy components of
creative thinking (Vartanian, 2012). Such strategies are commonly
used during creative problem solving, but it is also plausible that
this metaphor/analogy strategy division can be readily applied
in domains of creative expression, such as verbal creativity and
artistic creativity. Using such strategies as a common metric, it
would be possible to chart parallels and distinctions in neurocog-
nition across the creative problem solving and creative expression
domains.
This proposal to dissociate the problem solving and expres-
sion domains is based on preliminary ideas. No doubt there will
be a lot of stumbling as attempts are made to develop these baby
steps. Yet it is essential that we nonetheless attempt to formu-
late a workable framework in order to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying cre-
ativity. Differentiating problem solving from expression domains
in creativity would mean that insights obtained by, for instance,
investigating the brain connectivity in absolute pitch musicians as
a mark of musical creativity (Loui et al., 2011) or frontotemporal
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FIGURE 2 | A preliminary framework to distinguish between branches of creativity: problem solving domain and the expression domain. There are
subdomains (within oval forms) within each domain and strategies (within rectangular forms) common to both domains.
dementia patients who develop unprecedented artistic skills post-
stroke (Seeley et al., 2008), cannot be blindly generalized to find-
ings associated with studying brain activations that result while
performing the alternate uses task (Chrysikou and Thompson-
Schill, 2011). Such a view in no way advocates that selective
findings should be ignored. Quite the contrary. Any claim that
a study’s findings are relevant to any domain of creativity needs
to be assessed in terms of how it fits into the larger framework of
creativity.
As such a framework is currently lacking, the onus is on us
researchers to carry out our investigations with these larger objec-
tives in mind. So, for instance, when drawing allusions between
the expression and problem solving subdomains in creativity, it
would be useful to indicate how expression-based findings, such
as enhanced drawing skills following transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation (TMS) (Snyder et al., 2003) can be explicitly linked to
problem-solving-based findings, such as greater originality fol-
lowing cognitive stimulation (Fink et al., 2010). The division
between these creative problem solving and creative expression
domains may certainly be more fluid than we imagine and the
associations between them beg further exploration. Research
efforts that come close to bringing both these domains together,
such as evaluating the brain response during jazz improvisation
or freestyle rap in proficient musicians (Limb and Braun, 2008;
Liu et al., 2012), will aid us in reaching this aim.
Developing a classification system by which to approach var-
ious aspects of creativity would help us deal with further critical
issues such as formalizing the differences and similarities between
the diverse types of creativity as well as operationalizing the many
creativity tasks in terms of what proportion of cognitive oper-
ations are shared between them. These are necessary paths to
explore if the central objective of the neuroscience of creativ-
ity is to glean the underlying brain and information processing
mechanisms of this most extraordinary of human abilities.
CONCLUSIONS
This treatise explores many of the current challenges faced by
neuroscientists in the field of creativity. Although we face consid-
erable impediments, progress will necessarily certainly be made
in the field as long we confront the issues head on. There is a
dire need for more research groups all over the world to become
involved in the investigation of creativity. The necessity for collab-
orative efforts has never been stronger. The ideal way to kick start
such a venture would be to organize a series of workshops which
features exchanges between experts from the field of creativity
and those from relevant fields of psychology and cognitive neuro-
science (semantic cognition, imagery, etc.) to exchange ideas and
work together to develop a theoretical framework for the neuro-
science of creativity. It certainly is time for us to be more creative
about creativity. What better way than to move the focus from
individuals developing ideas in isolated cocoons to developing
our ideas together in a common space, where stimulating inter-
changes are guaranteed and where our hunches can develop and
be nurtured by other ideas (Johnson, 2011).
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